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The Problem of Monopolies
& Corporate Public Corruption
Zephyr Teachout
Abstract: Defining corruption as the exercise of public power for private, selfish ends, many theorists have
argued that individuals can be corrupt even if their actions are legal. This essay explores the knotty question of when legal corporate action is corrupt. It argues that when corporations exercise public power,
either through monopolistic control of a market or through campaign contributions and support of governmental actors, they are subject to the same responsibilities of anyone who exercises public power. Therefore, as a theoretical matter, we should call corporations corrupt when they exercise public power selfishly,
in a way that puts their own interests over the public’s interests. Because they make legal corporate corruption less likely, global anticorruption campaigns should therefore emphasize antimonopoly laws and
campaign finance laws.

Should we call legal corporate political behavior
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corrupt? If so, when?
It is a tricky issue. Of course, in some cases, corporate actors engage in illegal bribes of public officials, and we can easily label this behavior corrupt.1
But more frequently, corporate actors use sophisticated legal means to exercise power over public officials: by making campaign contributions, lobbying,
exerting media influence, funding nonprofits, sponsoring think tanks, paying speaking fees, or even cornering the market on key goods and services, creating public dependencies on the corporation. These
kinds of behaviors make up what Michael Johnston
has termed “influence markets,” which he identifies as the primary mode of corruption in developed
democracies.2 These behaviors are also explored in
depth in the works of sociologist Amitai Etzioni.3
All of these behaviors are not only legal in the United States, but are encouraged and taught as essential strategies in business schools. They also have the
tendency to spread. Having built their power within
© 2018 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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the United States or similar legal systems,
corporations then use legal tools to exert
influence in other countries. Depending
on which side of the law they stand on, corporate actors may push to legalize the most
powerful of their mechanisms of control,
criminalizing the tools used by weaker societal agents, or they may exercise their influence to decriminalize their behaviors
in a new market. The question is, which of
these behaviors should we call corrupt, and
which are merely corrupting?
In 1820 America, it was not illegal for a
corporation to give money to a member of
Congress in explicit exchange for that congressperson’s vote. In 2017 America, because of Citizens United, it is not illegal for a
corporation to spend millions of dollars to
punish a congressperson who voted against
its interests. We can certainly agree that the
former is corrupt; I think most would accept that the latter is also corrupt. But if legality is not the line between corrupt and
noncorrupt corporate political behavior,
what is?
I argue that we should use the same test
for corporations as we do for public officials, condemning selfish behavior as corrupt when it accompanies the exercise of
public power, regardless of whether that
public power derives from formal officeholding. Elected officials who exercise public power in the service of private ends are
corrupt irrespective of the legality of their
behavior. By extension–with understanding that it is not easy to identify what constitutes “public power” or even “selfish behavior”–all selfish exercise of public power
is corrupt. The key theoretical point is this:
public power, not public office-holding,
ought to be our marker for determining
who may be guilty of public corruption.
Corporate actors are corrupt when they exercise public power in a way that serves selfish ends at the expense of public ends, regardless of whether it is illegal, and regardless of whether they formally hold office.

The descriptive implications of this conclusion are substantial: it means that some
of the great drivers of contemporary corruption around the world today are large
multinational corporations engaging in
legal behavior. The practical implications
are also substantial, and flow from the improved description: our anticorruption
strategies must include antimonopoly
laws, not because antitrust violations are
themselves corrupt or because mergers are
themselves corrupt, but because corruption is more likely when economic power
is centralized. Failure to name legal corporate behavior as public corruption in global
anticorruption campaigns to date has led to
a focus on passing criminal laws and transparency laws, instead of examining problems of market structure and monopolization with global and domestic impacts. As
Lord Acton famously put it: “Power tends
to corrupt.” Power is especially likely to
corrupt when it is unconstrained by democratic accountability.
This kind of corporate and multinational corruption is a tragedy of design.
It flows from our failure to protect markets from concentrated economic power.
Corporate monopolies are a result of legal
frameworks that enable excessive concentration of private power, limit the freedom
to engage in moral action by officers and
directors, and create overwhelming incentives to bend public power to selfish ends.
Unlike small companies that have limited
incentive or capacity to corrupt–because
they do not exercise public power–multinational corporations, at a certain size and
with enough power, are built to corrupt.
The critical strategic solution to this design flaw is to engage antimonopoly laws
in anticorruption efforts. The antimonopoly approach is prophylactic instead of punitive; in this way it resembles elections,
another prophylactic anticorruption tool.
New antitrust enforcement should not seek
to punish corrupt behavior, but to encour-
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age structures of power that make corruption less likely. Open markets, free from
dominant players, are not only important
for a thriving economy and innovation,
but for limiting corruption.
This essay proceeds in two sections. The
first makes a theoretical argument and
shows that a surprising formalism pervades many approaches to understanding public corruption. This formalism appears in two ways: First, discussion of public power often stops with a formal analysis
of who holds a particular office, instead of
who wields power over that office. Second,
even those anticorruption analysts and activists who claim not to tie a definition of
corruption to legality tend to use legality as
an important marker in separating the corrupt from the noncorrupt. Building on these
theoretical points, the second section highlights antimonopoly and campaign contribution laws as critical sets of tools for dealing with this crisis of corruption.
To be clear, I do not make accusations
about corrupt behavior by particular modern corporate multinationals. An approach
of identifying after-the-fact bad actors is always going to be a weak strategy. Instead,
I lay out a theoretical framework for enabling accusations against modern corrupt
corporations and a practical road map for
deterring future corruption via structural
changes.

A ristotle laid out six kinds of govern-

ment: three ideal forms and three corrupt
forms. The rule of one he described as either monarchy or tyranny; the rule of a few
as either an aristocracy or an oligarchy;
and the rule of the many as either a polity
or mob rule. The fundamental difference
between the good and corrupted government, according to Aristotle, was the psychological orientation of those who governed: corrupt governments were selfish;
ideal governments sought the public good.
Explaining the difference between a tyr147 (3) Summer 2018

anny and a monarchy, he wrote, “the ty- Zephyr
rant looks to his own advantage, the king Teachout
to that of his subjects.” A tyrant is a king
who “pursues his own good”; an oligarchy
is an aristocracy that pursues its own good;
and mob rule is a publicly governed polity
whose constituent parts each pursue their
own selfish interests.4
This framework, which I have adopted,
suggests there are two key features of corruption: the exercise of governing power
and selfish intent. The implication of this
framework is that private actors engage in
public corruption when they wield governing power selfishly.
Within the anticorruption field, there are
those who describe corruption in terms of
the violation of formal roles and obligations, and those who see corruption in
terms of the illegitimate pursuit of private
interest at the expense of the public interest.5 The former ties itself in knots of positivism. As political scientist Richard Mulgan has recently argued:
By taking existing duties and rules as given,
such definitions are too closely tied to a particular institutional context. They do not provide an external standard by which to assess
whether the duties or rules themselves prohibit actions that should be regarded as corrupt.6

All parties appear to agree that public
power is an important feature of public
corruption, though this has been given
short shrift in some of the literature.7 For
instance, a recent article appearing in the
UCLA Law Review observes that most definitions of corruption involve the abuse
of public office for private gain. The article continues: “The term ‘public office’ is
relatively clear. It includes, among others,
those persons whom the electorate has entrusted with power to advance the public
interest.”8 Accompanying this assertion is
a link to a judicial decision about the scope
of a bribery statute, making the easy error
of conflating statutory law and definitions
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of corruption in one area but not in another. If one does not confine oneself to statutes, it is not at all clear that office, instead
of power, is the key question.9
For much of industrial history, private
parties were viewed as corrupt when
they exercised public power, regardless
of whether they held office.10 In the 1874
case Trist v. Child, an old man hired a lobbyist to help collect a debt from Congress.
After the lobbyist succeeded, the old man
refused to pay him; in response, the lobbyist sued the man for money owed. The
case came before the Supreme Court,
which had to decide whether contracts
to lobby were legitimate and enforceable
in court. The Court concluded that they
were not, writing that “If any of the great
corporations of the country were to hire
adventurers who make market of themselves in this way [for] the promotion of
their private interests, the moral sense of
every right-minded man would instinctively denounce the employer and employed
as steeped in corruption.”11 The Court’s
language indicates that corporations could
themselves be corrupt, not merely a means
by which public entities are corrupted.
But over the last forty years of anticorruption efforts, many academics and journalists have treated private companies as
corrupt only when engaged in what is
sometimes called “private corruption”:
namely, accepting internal bribes or kickbacks.12 Much of the discussion about private entities–big multinational companies
like Monsanto, Google, or Siemens–concerns whether we should recognize a category of private-to-private corruption.13 To
address these concerns, some definitions of
corruption focus on “entrusted power” instead of public power. Transparency International, for instance, defines corruption
as “the abuse of entrusted power for private
gain,” in order to include private-to-private
relationships within the definition. But
Transparency International does not have

a clear scope of what constitutes entrusted
power for purposes of public corruption,
nor does it examine whether multinational corporations can be seen as having “entrusted power” because of their enabling
statutes. Alternatively, private companies
are seen as corrupting when they induce
behavior on the part of elected officials, or
perhaps when they break existing anticorruption laws. They are not treated as corrupt for their use of legal mechanisms, even
when that use is for self-serving ends.
Some modern definitions openly rely on
public office, instead of public power, as a
central feature of corruption. Political scientist Joseph Nye’s influential definition
of corruption begins with a claim about
the centrality of formal roles, arguing that
corruption is either rule violation or “behavior which deviates from the formal
duties of a public role because of privateregarding (personal, close family, private
clique) pecuniary or state gains.”14 Several
other scholars have placed public office at
the center of the definition, but even those
who do not privilege the phrase “public
office” or “formal duties” often implicitly limit the accusation of public corruption to those with formal public power.15
How should we approach this question?
It is perhaps easiest to divide the possible
approaches into a formal approach and a
functional approach. The formal approach
limits the accusation of public corruption
to those who hold an official position.
The functional approach looks at whether
public power is exercised, regardless of
office-holding.
A formal approach leads to peculiar results. Imagine a rich business owner in a
small town. He consciously chooses to use
his wealth to elect a town council and mayor that will serve his interest and lower his
taxes. He is shameless about his desires:
he readily announces that he is only interested in himself, and will use whatever
means he can to serve himself. A formal
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approach would treat the business owner
as not corrupt because he is not an elected official. It would not ask how he uses
his wealth, whether in fact he has public
power, or whether he is being selfish. Instead, it looks merely at his status: since he
was neither appointed nor elected, it treats
him as someone who might be involved in
private corruption (accepting bribes in his
business) or someone who might lead to
the corruption of public officers, but not
someone who might be corrupt in his own
right.
On the other hand, a functional analysis
would treat this business owner as engaged
in public corruption because he is using
public power, and using it to serve private
ends without regard to the public good.
That he may also be corrupting the local
government is a secondary question. This
business owner is not unlike Aristotle’s
king (or oligarch), who chooses to rule
over others in a way that benefits himself.
That he uses the mechanisms of democracy does not change the fundamental combination of his ruling others and his moral
orientation.16
Another thought experiment in formalism also leads to the mangling of language.
Imagine a king who has inherited absolute
power over his country. He is selfish and
cares only for his own interests, not the interests of the public. Because he is worried
about revolt, he chooses to install an elected government, but creates laws allowing
for only one party on the ballot, and establishes informal mechanisms that ensure
that he is the only person who can select
who runs for office. He then officially steps
down from his position and abolishes the
monarchy. But there is no doubt that he
controls who gets “elected” and what decisions they make in office. A formal approach would say that only those elected
officials can be guilty of public corruption.
A functional approach would consider the
actual power dynamics, not the form.
147 (3) Summer 2018

As these examples show, a functional Zephyr
analysis is the more natural approach: for- Teachout
malism seems to simplify the concept, but
adds a requirement to public power of public office-holding that is hard to justify. Ruling is what creates moral obligations, regardless of how that rule is exercised. The
strongest argument against the formal approach is that there is no a priori reason to
limit the scope of public corruption to those
holding elected, appointed, or inherited office. The selfish interests in a corrupt government might be the interests of the people
holding formal power in the government,
but–critically–they can also be the private
interests of someone or something that exercises informal power over the official government from outside it.
The best defense of a formal approach is
that it is more administrable and renders
corruption easier to measure. But we should
not confuse the administrability of criminal and civil laws with the correct definition
of a nonlegal term like corruption, just as
we should not refuse to call something corrupt because it is difficult to measure. The
functional approach would be inappropriate for defining criminal laws of corruption;
it would require a fact-finder to make determinations of influence and power in a political society, beyond a reasonable doubt.17
But we are not rewriting legal definitions,
and inadequacy in criminal law does not
make the functional approach inadequate
in our efforts to locate corruption.
Another possible objection to the functional approach might be that it seems
harsh: it subjects private actors who have
never run for public office or sought to be
appointed to public office to accusations
of public corruption and obligations to the
public good that they never wanted. But on
the individual level, this problem does not
exist. Individuals are not required to exercise public power, even when they have
the capacity to do so. And most ceos of
most companies, like individuals, simply
115

The Problem
of Monopolies
& Corporate
Public
Corruption

116

have no capacity to exercise public power.
They are free to suggest ideas, set up meetings, and occasionally lobby officials, but
no one would argue that in so doing they
are exercising public power. Success in private business creates no obligation to engage in the public sphere in a selfish way.
Moreover, inasmuch as those with inherited public power never chose their position, we do not soften the blow of corruption accusations by arguing that kings cannot be guilty of misusing powers they did
not seek. They may always abdicate. However, for corporate officers and directors
of enormous companies that can exercise
governing power, this harshness does expose a fundamental problem with our current antimonopoly laws by creating two
obligations that conflict with each other.
Using the functionalist approach, we
should shift from an analysis of office-holding to an analysis of who holds “governing power.” Governing power exists when
a company, person, or institution has the
capacity to make choices that govern the
lives of others. A juror has governing power over the defendant. A magnate has governing power over his town when he uses
his ability to elect or defeat candidates who
then exercise formal power. Governance is
often defined by reference to a combination
of decision-making and the implementation of those decisions. Political scientist
Stephen Bell’s popular definition of governance argues that it is “the use of institutions, structures of authority and even collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society or the
economy.”18 The lines are by no means
clear; and there is not space here to explore
in full the difficult questions of what is and
is not governing power.
More important, the job of anticorruption activists is largely not to identify instances of normative failure, but to identify the syndrome, and then push for the
rules that make the syndrome less likely.

We need not spend much time debating
the particulars of who or what company
is corrupt, so long as we agree that there
is a broad set of powerful companies that
pursue selfish interests while exercising
public power.
By way of analogy, consider a national
campaign against alcoholism. One way to
deal with alcoholism is to try to identify
everyone who is alcoholic–engaging in
extensive studies to determine who might
be dependent on alcohol and who is merely drinking a lot–in order to provide individualized resources to those who need
them. In that approach, the question of
who makes the judgment about particular
individuals, and by what criteria they are
judged, is critical. But another approach
might be to use countrywide surveys to
identify that there is problem of alcoholism, and then suggest countrywide solutions that would reduce the levels of addiction overall and the likelihood of future addiction. In the second approach, we spend
little energy parsing the alcoholic from the
nonalcoholic, and most of our energy is focused on prophylactic rules.19
Using this syndrome approach, undoubtedly there are several big multinationals
engaged in public corruption. We need not
have a consensus around individual actors’
corruption in order to agree that there is
endemic corruption. Two analysts might
disagree over whether Siemens or Amazon has more governing power, but they
can certainly agree that some large multinational corporations engage in the selfish use of public power, and would likely
include both Amazon and Siemens in that
category.
For instance, I can argue that Google’s
exercise of public power is corrupt because it does so in pursuit of its own selfish ends, regardless of the impact on the
public good. As evidence to support my argument, I could point out that, as of 2017,
Google is the largest lobbyist in the Unit-
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ed States. Google has been implementing
a successful political strategy to embed its
software in public schools (both in order
to get its tools adopted and in order to collect data).20 Google is a major funder of
think tanks and has exercised its funding
power to shape policy, supporting scholars who support its own political ends. In
short, an essential, nonaccidental part of
Google’s business strategy is to shape public policy in a way that serves its own narrow interests. As with the rich businessman controlling the small town described
above, I argue that a functional analysis
would treat Google as corrupt. However, one need not agree with my particular
argument about Google in order to agree
that the structure of power in our society
makes it likely that powerful companies
like Google–if not Google itself–will use
public power for private ends.

The legality of the behavior is not deci-

sive in determining either whether there
is governing power or whether it is selfish. Google’s practices as described here
are entirely legal under U.S. law. Lobbying
is legal, funding think tanks is legal, building a political strategy to shape public education is legal, and supporting academics
is legal. Moreover, these behaviors should
be legal. However, the legality or illegality of a behavior is not a particularly useful
distinction in determining whether something is corrupt. As political scientist Dennis Thompson has argued, “Connections
that are proximate and explicit, elements
required to show bribery, are not necessarily any more corrupt than connections
that are indirect and implicit. The former
may be more detectable, but are not necessarily the more deliberate or damaging
form of corruption.”21
Instead, there are many possible relationships between the legality of a behavior and
its corruptness. First, it is possible that there
is no relationship between illegality and
147 (3) Summer 2018

corruption. The second possibility is that il- Zephyr
legality separates corrupt from noncorrupt Teachout
behavior. The third possibility is that illegal activity defines the heart of corruption,
that which is easiest to define and which we
should most readily condemn, but some legal activity is also corrupt, if less intensely so. The fourth possibility is that there is
often a relationship between illegality and
corruption, but that such correlation does
not help us decide in any particular instance
whether an action is corrupt or not. Corruption encompasses a great deal of legal behavior; only a small subset of corrupt behavior has been criminalized. Moreover,
noncorrupt behavior can be criminalized
and called “corrupt” by the state.
The final option–a correlative relationship but not sufficiently strong to make
presumptions–is the best way to understand the connection between corruption
and legality. While the overlap between
illegality and corruption exists, and may
not be wholly arbitrary, it approaches arbitrariness because the reasons for not criminalizing behavior are so varied and historically and culturally dependent. Unless one
is a positivist (believing law defines morality), there is no a priori reason to assume
a strong relationship between that which
has been criminalized and that which is
corrupt. In fact, given that power tends to
protect itself, in most polities we should
often start with the assumption that the
most corrupt acts are shielded from criminal liability by those in power. Those in
power, be they judges or lawmakers, may
have selfish reasons to protect corrupt behavior and criminalize noncorrupt behavior. World history is littered with regimes
that do not criminalize corrupt behavior
because those in power are engaged in it.
But even in a perfectly functioning democracy, where an engaged public would have
criminalized corrupt behavior, there are
many reasons for using other tools than
criminal law to deter corruption.
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The reasons for criminalizing some behavior and not others is often unrelated to
the morality of the action or the degree of
public condemnation. A democratic society
could decide that criminal law is not a particularly effective mechanism for deterring
corruption. In the United States, bribery of
members of Congress was not illegal at the
federal level until 1853. Before then, everyone thought that paying a congressperson
in exchange for changing a vote was corrupt; they simply did not use criminal law
as the tool for deterring such corruption.
Other considerations, like the desire to protect certain forms of expression, could lead
to the legalization of corrupt behavior. For
instance, under existing U.S. law, a senator
who accepts a personal gift of $15 with the
understanding that it will influence his or
her vote is committing federal bribery. No
explicit exchange is needed. However, if
the same senator accepts a campaign contribution of $5,000, knowing it represents
the purchase of the exercise of one hundred
votes, that does not violate federal bribery
law in the absence of an explicit contract or
agreement indicating the senator’s intent.22
There are reasons, both historical and protective of political expression, that make
the former a crime and the latter not. But
those reasons tell us nothing about the corruptness of the action. The fact that the latter is not a crime is not evidence that it is not
corrupt, or that it is somehow less corrupt.
As of 2016, it is legal under federal law in
the United States for someone to pay tens
of thousands of dollars to a state governor
in exchange for the governor, using the
official title of the office, setting up meetings and making introductions to other
officials and business executives. The Supreme Court struck down a law criminalizing this behavior because of free speech
and due process concerns. Nothing in the
decision suggested that the Court thought
that the behavior was not corrupt.23 In the
same vein, lobbying, which was criminal

behavior for one-third of American history,
has achieved protected legal status because
laws against lobbying were struck down as
violative of the First Amendment.24 This
is undoubtedly a good thing. But the fact
that criminalizing a behavior would threaten free speech is hardly sufficient to mean
that no instances of that behavior are exhibitions of corruption.
In sum, criminality and corruption may
have a substantial overlap in certain developed democracies, but that overlap does
not tell us much about the corruptness of
any particular act, or whether most corrupt acts are crimes.
You might argue that I have created a
straw man. It is the rare definition of corruption that openly relies on criminal law
as a starting point for determining whether
corruption exists. Definitions are far more
likely to refer to “abuse of public power
for private ends,” or “norm violation in a
self-serving way by those in public power.”
Even Joseph Nye, whose definition is often
characterized as requiring illegality, recognizes norm violation, apart from illegality,
within the category of corruption. However, among the scholars and commentators
who theoretically acknowledge that much
corrupt behavior is legal, many still exhibit an assumption that legality is a good
marker of corruption. Empirical studies
and economic models of corruption often
start with criminality.25 Transparency International starts with the assumption that
most corruption is illegal.26 Many comparative studies rely on criminality directly or
indirectly.
For instance, in Susan Rose-Ackerman’s
landmark book Corruption and Government:
Causes, Consequences, and Reform, she acknowledges that legal corruption is important, but states that because her work
is comparative, she will only look at those
instances in which laws were broken.27 She
further argues that it “may be rhetorically
valuable” to call legal behavior corruption,
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but that it does not “further the analytical”
or “policy exercise of understanding the
landscape and proposing reforms.”28 This
seems to get the analytical and policy project upside down: it privileges those with
the power to make the law with the power
to define corruption.29 Rose-Ackerman’s
recent work has been more likely to recognize legal behavior as a significant problem,
but I use this example because it is typical
of the simultaneous acceptance and rejection of legal corruption.30
Once the anticorruption community accepts that neither office-holding nor legality is a definitive marker of the existence
of public corruption, it becomes free to
explore corruption as it actually exists in
modern society.

In the last thirty years, the entire machin-

ery of modern multinational corporations
has developed, through law and culture, to
embrace the pursuit of public power as an
essential business function. The deep design of a large multinational corporation
is to build power to gain control over local governments and international regimes
in which it operates so that it can advance
policies that create value for the corporation.31 Large multinational corporations
routinely exercise public power, and do so
guided by private interests above public
ones. The intent/orientation of large corporations is easier to divine than the intent of most individuals or organizations.
When there is a conflict between public
and private interests, the enabling statutes
of a corporation require an orientation toward a limited set of stakeholders.
One might point out that corporate entities need not seek short-term profits.
As the U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed: “Modern corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue
profit at the expense of everything else,
and many do not.”32 The myth that corporations are required to maximize share147 (3) Summer 2018

holder value is just that: a myth, and one Zephyr
that is largely pushed by activist hedge Teachout
fund managers seeking to pressure corporations to produce short-term profits.33
However, corporations are not free to pursue the public good when doing so conflicts
with the long-term sustainability of the corporation. Under state law, directors and officers of a corporation have a duty of care
and of loyalty to the corporation. That duty
does not flow merely to shareholders, but
to all the stakeholders in a corporation. At a
basic, ethical level, these laws create an obligation to maximize value–arguably longterm, sustainable value–for the corporation. It is rare that a lawsuit succeeds on the
grounds that directors and officers violated
these obligations, but that does not mean
that the obligation does not exist. Instead,
the laws, designed to ensure that directors
and officers do not treat the corporation as
their own vehicle, also ensure that the public good cannot justify decisions that directly hurt stakeholders.
In many instances, corporate stakeholder
ends will either support the public interest
or at least be consistent with the public interest. In these instances, there is no corruption problem. Under other circumstances, a
ceo may have some discretion due to conflicting visions of long-term sustainability:
this discretionary space is where corporate
social responsibility (csr; a form of corporate self-regulation) is likely to be most powerful. In the overwhelming majority of other instances, the corporation will not exercise public power. In these cases also, there is
no corruption problem. For the millions of
small or medium-sized corporations, their
private obligations will not conflict with
public obligations, because such corporations simply do not have the power to shape
public policy on taxes, trade, antimonopoly, or contracting: they will face no moral
dilemma. The local pizza shop has no raft
of lobbyists, and if the owner makes a political donation, it will be $30 or $300, not
119
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a $300,000 independent expenditure. The
vast majority of companies never engage a
lobbying firm, let alone build all the tentacles of public-policy-bending machinery.
Some company owners may be wonderful and deeply invested in their community, others greedy and self-centered, but as a
structural matter, these companies do not
pose a public corruption threat.
However, for large corporations that invest heavily in politics, there will be frequent episodes in which the obligations
to long-term profitability and to the public
interest directly conflict. Four of the most
common conflicts involve tax laws, trade
laws, antimonopoly laws, and contracts
with the government. Big corporations will
almost always have an interest in lowering
their tax burden, improving their position
in global trade, decreasing antimonopoly
enforcement, and increasing opportunities
to win government contracts. Occasionally these interests will align with those of
the public, but frequently they will not. It
is indefensible–to all the stakeholders in
the corporation–not to be engaged in politics and not to build public power that can
be used to benefit the corporation in terms
of taxes, trade, antimonopoly, and government contracts. A ceo of Apple that did not
have a public relations firm would be fired
by its board of directors.
Imagine a ceo of a modern multinational corporation with $100 million to invest.
She can choose to invest the money in decreasing the cost of producing the product,
or she can invest the money in changing the
laws to decrease the corporate tax rate. The
first involves changing the production line,
switching some materials, and a slight product innovation; the second involves a combination of campaign contributions, direct
lobbying, media strategy, and coauthored
white papers. Most estimates suggest the
first strategy provides a 5 percent return
on investment, while the second strategy
provides a 50 percent return on investment.

The first strategy does not hurt the public at
large; the second strategy decreases essential tax revenue for schools. The first strategy involves no corruption. The second strategy is corrupt. We would expect the ceo to
engage in the second strategy. The selfish
exercise of public power–public corruption–is an essential part of the job.
How can we change that behavior? How
can we fight the threat of rampant legal
public corruption by large multinationals?
Some analysts, like Ben Heinemann Jr.,
argue that the discretion afforded directors and officers is far greater than that
which they exercise, and that corporate
leaders can, consistent with law and culture, pursue the public good. Heinemann’s
efforts are important, but cannot address
the problem posed by a corporation like
Apple that wants to reduce its tax burden
through lobbying and campaign contributions. Some might argue for a fundamental
overhaul in corporate law, explicitly requiring officers and directors to serve the public good. And the rise of new corporations
operating with clear public obligations
might create positive impacts at the margins, but the side effects of fundamentally
restructuring the corporate form would be
far from benign. Moreover, this argument
is antidemocratic, and essentially an argument for aristocratic/oligarchic rule: it accepts that multinationals play a governing
role, and merely requests that they do so
with a public orientation.
Instead, our anticorruption efforts should
focus on the precise point at which public corruption comes into play: when corporations come to exercise public power.
Corporate public corruption is most likely when the industry itself is very large and
heavily concentrated; when there are crossindustry interests in bending public power;
or when a single corporation has become
essential to a polity, or “too big to fail.”
In other words, we should focus public
policy on the problem of corporations ex-
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ercising public power–which only happens at a certain scale and degree of power
–and not the problems of corporations being selfish: let them be selfish, but do not
let them govern.
In the United States, there is a long tradition of resisting the corrupting tendencies of concentrated power through antimonopoly laws. These laws–at the center
of which is the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890–were not designed to punish corrupt
behavior, but to make corruption less likely. They were designed to prevent corporate directors and officers from facing the
point at which their public and corporate
obligations clashed. They were designed to
ensure that private parties did not gain unaccountable public power. As Justice William O. Douglas explained in his dissent in
the 1948 Supreme Court case U.S. v. Columbia Steel Co., the traditional philosophy of
American antitrust law is that
all power tends to develop into a government
in itself. Power that controls the economy
. . . should be scattered into many hands so
that the fortunes of the people will not be
dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of
a few self-appointed men.

Drawing on that tradition, we should embrace antimonopoly law as an essential tool
for fighting local and global corruption.
The first target might be highly concentrated industries. Profits are higher in concentrated industries, creating more cash
flow for investment in politics. (It is no accident that pharmaceuticals, an industry that
explicitly relies on monopolies, has among
the highest profits and the greatest political investments.) Moreover, it is simpler
and cheaper to organize a group consensus
when the potential members are few. Fewer actors can more easily make joint strategic decisions about what to demand from
government and create a shared, consistent message when lobbying and in meet147 (3) Summer 2018

ings. With fewer actors, the costs of identi- Zephyr
fying shared needs, of coordinating timing, Teachout
and of identifying and punishing free-riders
are all reduced. In monopolistic or oligopolistic industries, it is easier to share fixed
costs, like writing legislation, identifying
targeted politicians, and producing effective messaging. The concentrated industry
therefore can more economically lobby for
shared goals, including decreasing taxes for
the industry, increasing subsidies for the industry, decreasing regulations, and creating public insurance for the industry. An essential part of our anticorruption strategy,
then, must be decreasing concentration.
That means looking at industries that are
dominated by few firms, such as online advertising or online retail.
Anticorruption reformers should also
focus on corporations that have grown so
large that they represent a significant fraction of the economy. When the size of a corporation relative to the gdp is significant–
like 2 percent of gdp–democratic choices become constrained by the self-interest
of the individual corporation. Even in the
absence of resources devoted to purchasing political influence, the company with
a large relative size will have public power. Its sheer size makes it incumbent upon
legislators to design laws that will at minimum ensure the stability of the company.
If Lockheed goes under and lays off all of its
employees, that has an impact on the entire
economy. Even without lobbying, therefore, Lockheed can make demands of government based on the threat of its own failure. Companies that are large relative to the
size of a country’s gdp can control politics
by threatening to collapse or leave if their
demands are not met.
In concrete terms, global anticorruption should support free and open markets, with decentralized economic actors.
We should support antitrust efforts that
put barriers in the way of companies’ monopolistic behavior, such as the European
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Union’s efforts against Google; support
antitrust regimes that lead to breaking up
heavily concentrated industries and stopping mergers; and support campaign finance regimes that make corporate influence on elections more difficult. The goal
is to encourage an approach toward power that recalls Justice Louis Brandeis: concentrated private power is corrupt and corrupts, and therefore should not be allowed.
The most useful antimonopoly, anticorruption strategies will differ in particular
contexts; but as the exercise of power by
multinationals continues to grow, there
are a handful of urgent approaches:

· Applying neutrality principles to plat-

·
·
·

·
·
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forms like Google and Facebook, and
not allowing vertical integration: search
services and advertising must be broken
up. Amazon and Apple must be limited
in their ability to discriminate in price or
search, and to use pay-to-play models in
their search. The massive public power
and control wielded by these platforms
depend on their ability to leverage their
power in one area to make profits in another. This approach includes condemning countries that refuse to limit platform
dominance and power.
Supporting legal regimes that separate
distribution from content in cable and
wireless companies, requiring the breakup of Comcast, for instance. Condemning
countries that refuse to separate the two.
Urging countries to break up big banks,
both in terms of size and function.
Supporting the breakup of the monopolies of companies like Monsanto, allowing for competition from farmers;
opposing the Monsanto-Bayer merger;
supporting countries that ban the ownership of seeds and chemicals.
Encouraging global trade agreements to
disfavor monopolistic practices.
Condemning countries that allow corporate spending in elections.

None of these principles is simple to
implement. There will necessarily be a
high degree of over- and under-inclusiveness in any rule. There is no magic number representing company size within a
country, or across countries, and no magic structural relationship that will avoid
these harms. This, of course, is true for
most laws: even for something seemingly more straightforward like traffic law,
there is no magic number at which the
speed limit best accommodates the principle of reducing unnecessary deaths. But
when it comes to governance and rules of
governance, there is always special difficulty in defining the rules of the game,
because the rules of engagement create
the outcome, including the outcome of
what the rules of engagement should be.
However, the difficulty in designing rules
should not be a deterrence to trying. The
underlying argument here is similar to
that of the mid-twentieth-century Chicago school of economics. Our visions of
human nature differ: I believe people are
complicated and can be public-orientated,
that we are not solely or even primarily
homo economicus. And we use different language. But these economists from Chicago
saw the threat of corruption of large corporations wielding public power. They were
worried about a future of “rent-seeking,”
as they called it, shifting public policy as
a strategy for increasing profits. In “The
Theory of Economic Regulation,” George
Stigler famously wrote that “regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed
and operated primarily for its benefit.”34
Stigler, Gary Becker, Richard Posner, and
others argued that the size of government
should shrink to prevent corruption, because a smaller government with weaker
central governing powers would create less
incentive for private actors to seek public power. They argued that rent-seeking
would be more likely in highly regulated
industries because the existence of regu-
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lation and differentiation is what inspired
corporate political involvement.
However, they did not push for an aggressive antimonopoly strategy. Instead,
they pushed to dismantle antimonopoly
laws. Why? They made two basic theoretical mistakes in their description of politics.
First, they imagined a limited set of policies
that might affect a company and, second,
they presumed an upper limit of the value that companies could extract from governments. Judge Posner argued that once
a company becomes a monopolist, it has
“less incentive to expend resources on obtaining the aid of government in fending off
competitors” than one in a highly competitive industry.35 Posner imagines that the
would-be monopolist faces a single rent
(monopoly) that, once secured, sates his interest, and operates as a ceiling of all possible rents. This is clearly false: experience
shows that big companies, having invested
in securing a foothold in power, will have already paid much of the fixed cost of building the machinery to exercise public power, and will be more imaginative (and efficient) in using it to secure more benefits of
different kinds. This logical flaw also shows
up in the work of Gary Becker. In his classic
1983 paper modeling rent-seeking, Becker
describes an upper limit on what a company will seek from the government: “The
total amount raised from taxes, including
hidden taxes like inflation, equals the total
amount available for subsidies, including
hidden subsidies like restrictions on entry
into an industry.”36 However, the creative
rent-seeker, like the entrepreneur in any
area, will not look at present flows to determine potential flows, but will look at possible flows given political limitations. There
is no theoretical constraint on the potential size of the subsidy. The potential value
of the subsidy is not defined by existing
taxes. More taxes can be levied: the existing population of the country does not define it, because levies (direct and indirect)
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can be brought to bear on other countries’ Zephyr
populations. As a theoretical matter, then, Teachout
the upper limit of a subsidy from a government is the maximum revenue the government can generate through its power.
(As a practical matter, the probabilities approach zero as the subsidy approaches the
maximum revenue.) This is not a small
point. There are plenty of real-world examples in which companies exercise public power to secure benefits despite the absence of existing revenue. The bailout of the
financial institutions is one example; the insurance mandate sought by insurance companies is another. And at a smaller scale,
laws that require schools to teach technology classes are, from the perspectives of certain technology companies, rent-seeking
laws: they are not grounded in existing
revenue but rely on school boards to create it. Deficit spending is not limited by current tax revenues. And one can seek rents
through the manipulation of monetary policy in a way that is not limited by existing
revenues. In other words, the total potential benefits are bounded by the total potential (not actual) governmental revenue, including debts. The fixed upper limit model was essential to the argument that
that concentration in industries posed no
corruption threat.

Anticorruption crusaders have for decades

asked companies to join them in fighting
corruption on a global level. Some of these
efforts have doubtlessly produced public
good. However, corporate social responsibility is bound to be insufficient to address the
threat of corruption that flows from those
companies themselves. Even the most aggressive corporate social responsibility standards do not exhort companies unilaterally
to become less politically powerful. Even if
they did, it is unlikely that such an exhortation would work: it is hard to imagine Microsoft choosing not to merge with LinkedIn
because of internal csr policies.
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Corporate public corruption flows from a
tragic tension: between directors’ or officers’ obligation to the corporation’s health,
and their ability to increase profitability by
increasing corporate power. There is ample
evidence that massive corporations, even
those perceived as leaders in csr, invest
heavily in public relations to reduce their
tax burden. They do not bribe, but they
extract wealth from the public through tax
cuts; on a net level, they add more corruption than they reduce.
One approach locates the institutional
flaw in corporate law and corporate obligations, arguing that officers and directors
should be ethically free to pursue the public good even when it directly conflicts with
corporate goals. In the Aristotelian framework, one might call this the aristocratic approach: the goal is to free corporate ceos to
be aristocrats instead of oligarchs. While I
laud these efforts, I am troubled by the vision they present: unaccountable corporate

actors independently choosing that which
is best for the country, and quite possibly
the world. Moreover, systems of aristocracy
are notoriously weak, and tend toward corruption themselves. Freedom plus exhortation does not always mean virtue. The occasional multinational will resist the temptation to reduce its own taxes or deregulate
its industry, but that is hardly a prospect to
rely on. As Madison famously wrote in Federalist Paper No. 51: “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”
The problem is not with the existence
of the corporation, or with corporate law.
More free and open markets would lead to
less corruption. The problem is with concentrated power: a handful of actors who
are sui generis; so large and powerful they
can bend public power. The modern anticorruption movement chooses not to address these large actors, using formalism
or legalism as an excuse, at all of our peril.
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